IRRIGATION WATER RATE REFORM AND ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE by Schuck, Eric C. et al.
Irrigation Water Rate Reform and Endogenous Technological Change
by 
Eric C. Schuck, Gareth P. Green and David L. Sunding
Paper presented at the Western Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meetings,
Vancouver, British Columbia, June 29 - July 1, 2000.  
Copyright 2000 by Eric C. Schuck, Gareth P. Green and David L. Sunding.  All rights reserved. 
Readers may make verbatim copies for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
                                               
The authors are:  assistant professor, North Dakota State University, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Fargo, ND 58105; visiting professor, Seattle University, Department of Economics
and Finance, Seattle, WA 98122; and Extension Economist, Department of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, University of California Berkeley, CA 94720, respectively.  This research
was supported by a Challenge Grant from the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation in cooperation with
the Natural Heritage Institute.  The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District and the
granting agencies.1
Introduction
Traditionally, dealing with chronic and inherent irrigation water scarcity in the western United
States has meant augmenting supplies through the creation of large storage and diversion projects. 
Increasing competition for water from urban populations, mounting costs, and rising
environmental concerns are making water management policies built on physical solutions less
viable, and alternatives are being sought.  The use of water price as a policy tool is one such
alternative receiving increased attention from western water managers.  Indeed, the largest
provider of irrigation water in the western United States, the Bureau of Reclamation (USBR),
recently required irrigation districts in California’s Central Valley to adopt conservation pricing as
a Best Management Practice (USBR, 1998).  
Unfortunately, irrigators adapt to changing water rates in multiple ways so the
effectiveness of conservation pricing as a policy tool may be limited.  Irrigators adjust water
diversions, acreage allocations, and production technology to cope with rising water prices.
Multi-faceted responses by irrigators have led to two major problems in the use of water price as
a conservation tool.  The first, as noted by Huffaker et al. (1998) in an analysis of tiered-pricing as
a conservation tool, is that promoting water conservation (i.e., reducing water consumption) in
one context may not promote overall improvements in water use throughout a basin or water
service area depending upon return flows and irrigators’ technology responses.  The second
problem, discussed in a survey by Michelsen et al. (1999), is that competing definitions of water
conservation encourage irrigation districts to adopt water rate structures which do little to
influence irrigator consumption patterns.  Most of the districts surveyed by Michelsen et al.
employ water rates tied to acreage served rather than water consumed, and those districts which2
did use volumetric pricing set rates at levels which allowed nearly all water demand to be met. 
Neither method necessarily promotes serious reductions in water consumption. 
In the presence of varied price responses, competing conservation definitions, and the low
number of irrigation districts enacting strong rate reforms, evaluating irrigation water rate reform
is very complicated.  This is especially true if an irrigator’s primary response to a rate change is to
adopt new production technology.  Caswell, Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1990) and Caswell and
Zilberman (1985) showed that irrigation water costs have a strong influence on a grower’s
irrigation technology choice and that changes in water costs promote adoption of more efficient
irrigation systems.  These results confirm a technical change phenomenon first noted by Hicks
(1963), specifically that a change in the relative prices of inputs can induce technological change. 
Unfortunately, technological change is not always easily observed.  If a change in the
relative price of irrigation water compels a grower to learn how to operate her enterprise
differently and there are no externally observable changes in production capital, the grower has
endogenously adopted a new production technology.  An example of this type of change would be
a grower learning how to grow new or alternative crops with which she previously had no
experience.  The physical attributes of the farm remain the same, but the set of crops which the
grower can now produce has been expanded.  Production technology has changed without
external evidence.          
Irrigators endogenously adopting new production technology and learning to grow
alternative crops can potentially alter the relative profitability of their crop selections.  Such
changes can lead to rate-change responses which appear perverse.  Growers switching to more
profitable crops after the price change rather than before would appear to have missed an3
opportunity for profit.  Since water rates are an input price, a rate change should not alter the
relative profitability of crops and this movement would appear to be incompatible with profit
maximization.  However, it is compatible with a technology shift if the irrigator could not
previously select the more profitable crops.  Indeed, if a technology shift is strong enough, a rate
change may even increase water demand.  This paradoxical result is made all the more curious by
the unobserved nature of technological change.   
There have been few opportunities to evaluate if such technology shifts occur.  As noted
previously, few irrigation districts have enacted rate reforms strong enough to induce major
adjustments in water use by irrigators.  The Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (the District) in
Kern County, CA is an exception.  Following recommendations from researchers of this project,
the District implemented a rate change for the 1995 growing season that led to both rising water
use and major adjustments in crop acreage.  This result was not anticipated, but may provide
evidence of endogenous technological change.  As a result, it is now possible to determine
whether or not changes in water prices intended to reduce water consumption can induce
technology adjustments that lead to paradoxical results.        
Background
Significant attention has been paid to the use of water price as a conservation tool in recent years. 
Although the effects of block-rate pricing are unclear, much of this research has involved the use
of block-rate pricing.  Wichelns (1992) found that under a block-rate pricing regime water
applications for some crops decreased while others increased and growers adapted their
technology use.  Research by Brill, Hochman and Zilberman (1998) showed that block-rate4
pricing was sub-optimal in comparison to water marketing systems when a system has historical
water rights, while work by Huffaker, et al. (1998), showed that the use of increasing block rate
prices does not necessarily lead to reductions in water consumption and may in fact promote
improvements in irrigation efficiency which increase net water losses in a basin.  As a whole, the
use of block-rate pricing does not necessarily lead to water conservation.  
Alternatives to block-rate pricing have also been explored.  Tsur and Dinar (1997) in a
comparison of alternative water pricing methods found that water price primarily affects cropping
patterns rather than water use and that land-based fees do not lead to water use efficiency.  While
land-based fees did not lead to water use efficiency, Tsur and Dinar also showed that water use
efficiency can be achieved through several types of water pricing and that the nature of the
efficiency (i.e., short vs. long run, use vs. social ) varies by water pricing method.  As a result, it is
by no means clear what effects alternative water pricing regimes have on water use or what
pricing methods are preferred.  
Determining how growers respond to alternative water rates begins with focusing on how
irrigators adjust input usage to cope with changes in water price and availability.  What stands out
from most of the existing research is how insensitive marginal water use is to changes in water
supply.  Other factors, such as soil type and existing production technologies, have been shown to
be more important to water use decisions (Green et al., 1996).  Elasticity estimates for water
typically show water as being price inelastic and not substitutable in production (Nieswiadomy,
1988; Ogg and Gollehon, 1989).  Work by Sunding et al. (1997) has shown that irrigators’
primary response to water scarcity and drought is fallowing rather than adjustments in water
application.  As a result, water analysis has shifted from marginal water application rates to5
longer-run issues such as analyzing the effects of changes in water price and scarcity on land
allocation.  
Studies emphasizing acreage allocations have confirmed that water scarcity and price
typically affect irrigators at the extensive margin through land allocation rather than the intensive
margin through water use rates.  Moore, Gollehon, and Carey (1994) showed that while farm-
level water use typically declines in water price, this does not necessarily hold true for individual
crops nor is it true for crops once acreage has been allocated. 
Scarcity’s role in determining if water policy research should focus on land allocation or
water use rates is in dictating the nature of water as a productive input.  While water is often
viewed as a variable input in agricultural production, research by Moore and Dinar (1995)
suggests scarcity makes water a fixed, allocatable input.  Such a result changes water allocation
from a marginal application problem to a budgeting problem and imposes strong limitations on
how growers can be modeled.  In particular, as noted by Moore and Negri (1992), use of standard
duality results will lead to specification errors when modeling grower behavior if water is actually
a fixed, allocatable input.
While all of these studies provide valuable insight into how growers respond to changes in
water scarcity and price, there are two serious points of concern which are not addressed.  To
start, previous work does not distinguish between groundwater and surface water supplies.  Each
model describes either a sole-source water supply or, when both groundwater and surface water
are available, combines water supplies and assumes groundwater is the marginal source.  As a
result, these models do not explicitly address the issue of groundwater substitution.  In many
regions, imported surface water supplies were brought in specifically to reduce groundwater1Richard Shumway deserves credit for this observation.  
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usage.  Pricing changes which encourage growers to substitute groundwater for surface water as
their primary water source may not be desirable.  Isolating groundwater demand from surface
water demand and assessing the effects of a change in surface water price on groundwater usage
is an important policy issue.
The second issue is more fundamental and deals with the consistency of previous modeling
with assumptions of profit maximization.  Nearly all previous work has shown the primacy of land
allocation in determining water demand and that water price changes typically lead to reallocation
of acreage.  Under the assumption of profit maximization, this would imply growers are moving
to a crop which is more profitable after the price change than before.  However, since water price
is an input price, it should not influence the relative profitability of crops.  A crop which is
relatively more profitable after an input price change should have been relatively more profitable
before the input price change.
1  Failure to move from one crop to another before the price change
represents a missed opportunity for profit and suggests that growers are either behaving in a
manner which is not consistent with the assumption of profit maximization or that previous
models are in some way mis-specified.
A possible explanation for this apparent contradiction is technological change.  If growers
respond to a change in the relative price of water by altering how they manage their irrigation,
they are implicitly adopting a new production technology.  Since these changes in management
techniques are not manifested in any physical form, they are internal to the irrigator and represent
an endogenous change.  This is not a new concept; work by Wichelns (1992) has shown that
growers respond to changes in water price by altering how they utilize pre-existing irrigation7
technology.  As a result, external observation would show no outward changes in physical capital,
but production technology is changing in response to price.          
      
Analytical Framework
The research begins by addressing the acreage allocation and water demand decisions of an
individual grower.  Following Shumway (1983) and Chambers and Just (1989), the grower is
modeled as a multi-output firm which is joint in production and with acreage held constant. 
Basically, the grower makes two decisions.  The first decision is how to allocate acreage, while
the second is how much water to demand from all sources given acreage.  It is assumed that the
grower allocates the acreage vector l optimally in response to all crop prices, acreage-related
costs, and water prices.          
Production is spread across K crops and is a function of acreage allocated to a crop, lk ,
and effective water applied to a crop,  .  Effective water is the sum total of the ä(sk % gk)
grower’s surface water diversions sk , and ground water pumping, gk weighted by irrigation
efficiency, d.  Production for each of the K different crops is given by the function  
which is concave in both acreage and effective water.  Production is also f(lk, ä(sk % gk); è )
a function of the grower’s internal technology coefficient, q, which represents the grower’s
management of existing physical capital.  Adjustments in q in response to an input price change
represent endogenous technological change.  If an input price change induces the grower to8
improve q endogenously and the grower “learns” how to manage her resources better, grower
productivity will increase as a result of an input price increase.       
Grower water costs are the sum of expenditures on surface water, ground water pumping
costs, and irrigation system costs.  Surface water is purchased by the grower from an irrigation
district at the price r.  The grower can pump her own ground water through the function








costs are a function of all ground water pumping; this is a source of jointness in production for the
grower.  It is assumed that the ground water pumping cost function is increasing in ground water
pumping and includes drawdown effects on the aquifer.  As with production, pumping is a
function of the technology parameter q.  However, unlike production pumping energy is a
declining function of technology so improvements in technology reduce pumping costs.  
Irrigation system costs are the costs of running and maintaining an irrigation system across
the grower’s enterprise.  These costs are a function of technology and total applied water, or




source of jointness in production for the grower.  Irrigation system costs are given by the function
.  As with ground water pumping costs, irrigation system costs are C( j
K
k
(sk % gk); è)
increasing in total water usage and decreasing in technology.     
Combined with crop prices pk and water fees tied to acreage, h, these functions give the
grower’s restricted profit function,    p (p, l, r, e, q, h, d ).  As noted by Chambers and Just (1989)
and Shumway, Pope and Nash (1984), with jointness in production, individual input allocations
cannot be derived via traditional duality results through Shepherd’s Lemma.  Instead, they are the
result of solving the following maximization problem:  
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Each of these simply requires that water’s marginal production value equals either the price of
surface water or the marginal pumping costs of groundwater.  If both water sources are used,
then the price of surface water and marginal pumping cost of ground water are equal.  If that does10
not hold, the grower will use whichever of the two water sources is cheaper.  This captures the
possibility of groundwater substitution due to a change in the surface water price r.
The solutions to equations 2) and 3) are the grower’s surface and ground water demand
functions.  Due to the jointness introduced by the grower’s pumping function and the irrigation
system cost function, these demands are expressed as the farmer’s total water demand and are not
broken down by crop.  The grower’s surface and ground water demand functions are respectively:
4) s=s (p, l, r, e, q, d )
5) g=g (p, l, r, e, q, d )
The two water demands are increasing in output prices and land.  Surface water declines in r
while ground water increases, and the reverse is true for the energy price e.  The effect on each 
water demand of the endogenous technology parameter q is indeterminate.  Improvements in
technology improve the productivity of each unit of water.  This can either reduce the amount of
water used to achieve a given level of output or may promote expanded production and water
demand.     
To this point, the analysis has not addressed acreage beyond assuming that acreage is held
constant in the restricted profit function defined in equation 1).  Acreage changes are long-run
adjustments to rate changes, and optimal acreage allocations are found by optimizing the solution
to equation 1) over acreage.  Acreage, however, differs from water demands in one critical way. 
Acreage is allocated at the beginning of a planting season, and most prices are not known with
certainty when crops are planted.  As a result, unlike water demands which are made later in the
growing season and with more complete information, acreage allocation is a function of expected
profits.  As a result, acreage allocations are found by solving the following problem:11
6) ˆ ð( p, r, e, è, h, ä) ’ max
lk
E ð( p, l, r, e, è, h, ä)
where E denotes the expectations operator.  The solution to equation 6) is:
7)   l
(
k ’ lk( p, r, e, è, h, ä)
Acreage is increasing in output prices, and decreasing in surface water price, energy price, and
acreage related water fees.  As with the two water demands, the effects of technology are
indeterminate.  
The combination of alternative water sources and technological change greatly
complicates the analysis of a rate change.  The grower’s applied water demand, or AW, is the sum
total of her ground and surface water demand for all crops, or:
8) AW ’ {s(@) % g(@)}
































The grower’s response to the price change can be broken down into three effects.  The first is a12




is declining in r while ground water is increasing in r, so for a price increase the grower reduces
surface water but replaces some of it with ground water.  












effect is where the grower adjusts acreage in response to a rate change.  Assuming that acreage
and water are complimentary in production, this effect should be negative as the grower reduces
acreage.  
The last effect is the most difficult to evaluate, and is related to the technology parameter


















improvement in technology on applied water is indeterminate.  While technology is enhanced in
response to a price increase and  is therefore positive, the influence of a technology Mè
Mr13
improvement on each of the input demands is difficult to determine a priori.  An improvement in
technology may reduce the demand for each input by improving production efficiency, or it may
make each input more productive.  The latter can potentially increase demand for the input, even
as the price increases.  Additionally, the results of a technological improvement may not affect all
inputs equally.  Since applied water is a function of both water sources and each of the two water
sources are functions of acreage, different responses between inputs leads to great uncertainty
about the overall effect of a rate increase.  The end result is that the combination of water
substitutability and technological change makes it impossible to determine if applied water
demand is rising or falling in response to a rate increase.  Empirical determination is a necessity.  
Empirical Model and Estimates
The Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (the District) in Kern County, CA manages a
conjunctive use system with highly variable water supplies.  Since first receiving surface water
deliveries in 1966, the District has seen supplies range from a low of 36,000 acre-feet to a high of
376,000 acre-feet.  During droughts, which the District defines as any water year where surface
water supply is less than surface water demand, the District operates groundwater pumps to
supply water to growers who cannot access groundwater and encourages growers with access to
groundwater to use these resources rather than scarce surface water supplies.  The District
experiences these conditions to varying degrees of severity 45% of the time.  
As part of its drought management strategies and in response to the recommendations of
researchers of this project, the Arvin Edison Water Storage District (the District) adopted a new
rate structure in 1995.  The rate change moved growers from a contracted quantity purchased at14
the beginning of a growing season to a price-based system.  The original system often resulted in
growers purchasing more water than was necessary and was perceived as promoting excessive
pre-irrigation at the end of each water year as growers tried to consume water they had already
purchased.  The new system allows growers to purchase water as it is needed and was intended to
improve marginal water use efficiency by either reducing water deliveries or improving the
profitability of applied water.  The effects of the rate change are not obvious.  In every year since
the rate change, the District has seen water use rise while cropping patterns have oscillated
between a variety of different crops.  Existing irrigation technologies do not appear to have
changed in response to the rate change.  As a result, it is unclear if the rate change had its
originally intended effect of promoting water conservation.  This research analyzes how growers
responded to the changes in water rates and if those responses led to significant crop switching or
reductions in water use.  In particular, the research determines if there is evidence of endogenous
technology shifts in response to the water rate change.
Using District water demand and acreage data from 1982-1998, the effects of the 1995
rate change are evaluated by developing an input demand system for the District and estimating
water demand and acreage allocation.  District surface water demand and acreage allocations are
taken from District records, while ground water demand comes from the engineering firm of
Bookman-Edmonston.  The model assumes a restricted quadratic production technology for
output and a quadratic cost function for ground water and irrigation water costs.  To preserve
homogeneity, all prices are expressed relative to District surface water prices.  The restricted
quadratic specification has the advantage of being both a flexible functional form and linear in
parameters.  For the empirical analysis, the k crops are represented by the following categories:2Crop prices are the lagged weighted average prices for these crops as reported by the Kern County
Agricultural Commission in their Annual Report.  These crop categories reflect the standard classifications
used by the District.      
3The average cost of ground water is a function of the observed aquifer level and the
energy rates charged farmers by Pacific Gas and Electric under their Agricultural Rate Schedule
5b.  
4Crop prices were also initially used, but were excessively collinear with acreage.
5This specification assumes jointness in production due to jointness in water costs. 
Jointness due to a fixed, allocatable acreage constraint was explored but rejected.  
15
alfalfa, cotton, field, grain, pasture, potatoes, truck, vineyards, deciduous, and citrus.
2  
Two types of equations are estimated econometrically.  The first type is the two district-
level surface and ground water demands.  Each water demand is a function of surface water price,
the average cost of groundwater
3, and acreage allocations.
4  To determine if a change in the
relative prices of the two water sources induced an endogenous technological change, a
technology trend variable is weighted by the ratio of surface water price to average ground water
costs and included in both water demands.  Drought and rate change dummy variables are also
included to determine if either drought conditions or the 1995 rate change led to structural change
in the District.    
Acreage allocations are the second type of equation estimated.  For these equations, crops
in the District were divided into two general categories: annuals and perennials.  Alfalfa, field,
grains, pasture, potatoes and truck were the annual crops, while citrus, deciduous, and vineyards
were the perennial crops.  The distinction was made to capture the difference in planting flexibility
between the two different crop categories.  Annual crops were modeled as a function of all crop
prices, average ground water costs, and surface water price
5.  Acreage-related charges were16
dropped because the District assesses these as a fixed levy which does not influence marginal
acreage decisions.  As with the water demand equations, a technology trend interaction variable, 
rate change policy dummy, and drought dummy were also included. 
Perennial crops were modeled in a slightly different manner.  Since adjustments in
perennial crops are not done easily, perennial acreage was modeled as a function of lagged
acreage, crop prices, average ground water costs, surface water price, and the three policy
analysis variables.   As with the two water demand equations, a technology trend variable
weighted by the ratio of surface water price to ground water costs is included to determine if a
change in the relative prices of water induced a technological change in acreage allocations.          
Estimation is carried out in GAMS using single equation Generalized Maximum Entropy
(GME) as outlined by Mittelhammer and Cardell (1997).  GME is employed due to its relatively
better small sample properties and greater efficiency with collinear data sets in comparison to least
squares estimators.  While ordinarily a systems-type estimator would be utilized to account for
simultaneities between acreage allocation and water demand, it should be noted that the land
allocation and water demand equations are diagonally recursive (since land  appears as an explicit
argument in the water equations but not vice versa) so single equation estimation is valid
(Kmenta, p. 586; Greene, pp. 596-97).  
Results and Conclusions
The results from the econometric analysis are contained in Tables 1) through 3).  Table 1)
contains the parameter estimates and t-statistics for the two water demand equations.  Annual
acreage results are contained in Table 2), and perennial acreage results are in Table 3).  17
The two water demand equations performed well, particularly given the degree of
collinearity present in the data.  The first interesting issue to come out of the water demand
models is the singular importance of acreage levels in determining water demand.  For surface
water demands, acreage is significant for all of the 10 crop types and acreage is significant for 7 of
the 10 crop types for ground water.  While output prices were initially dropped from the water
demand equations to cope with collinearity problems, excluding these variables did not
significantly alter the results.  This suggests that in the presence of two water supplies and fixed
acreage, water is strictly essential in production relative to acreage allocations and water demand
reduces to a cost minimization problem between the two water sources.  As a result, when
alternate water sources are available, crop prices influence water demand through acreage
allocations and not through the value of the marginal product of water.     
The price of surface water relative to ground water costs is directly significant for surface
water but not for ground water demand, and is significant through the technology trend variable
only for surface water.  While this may seem counter-intuitive, it matches ground water’s role as a
residual source of water supply.  Surface water price influences ground water primarily through
the decision to switch water sources, and as a result may not directly influence marginal ground
water demand decisions. 
What is most critical between these two water demands, however, is the significance and
negative sign of the technology trend/relative water price variable in the surface water demand
equation.  Compared to the relative price variable alone, this variable is much larger in its impacts. 
This suggests that suggests that in the short run demand for surface water is relatively inelastic
and strictly essential in production with respect to acreage, but that as time passes irrigators18
become much more sensitive to changes in the relative price of water and adjust water
consumption downward.  This outcome supports the hypothesis of endogenous technological
change since the long-run trend related to relative changes in water prices is to reduce water
demand while the immediate response is either small or indistinguishable from zero.  The drought
and rate change policy dummy variables were not significant for either water demand.
The influence of surface water price on annual acreage allotments is difficult to assess. 
Surface water price appears relative to both output prices and ground water costs.  For each of
the seven annual crops, the parameters tied to own-output price and some substitute output crop
prices relative to surface water price are significant.  The significance of many of the cross-price
parameter supports the assumption of jointness in production in the model specification.  
The parameters associated to relative water prices and the technology trend/relative water
price variable, however, are insignificant for all of the annual crops.  This suggests that for each of
the annual crops, the ability to substitute between crops on an annual basis provides adequate
flexibility for coping with changes in relative water prices.  Additionally, for annual crops relative
changes between output prices and water prices exert more of an influence on acreage levels than
changes in relative water costs alone.  This also matches the conclusion from the water demand
equations that water demand is driven primarily by acreage, but acreage levels are driven by
output prices.
While annual crops did not respond to relative changes between surface water price and
ground water costs either in the short or long run, perennial crops were sensitive to both of these
changes.  The short-run parameters tied to the effects of relative changes in output prices and
water prices were significant for all of the three perennial crops.  More importantly, for all three19
of the crops the effects of the technology trend/relative water costs parameter was positive and
significant.  These crops are among the most important crops in the District and account for
nearly 50% of the District’s irrigated acreage.  A positive long-run technology response in
acreage to changes in relative water prices for these crops can potentially explain the unusual
increase in water demand the District observed following the 1995 rate change.  This response
suggests growers are expanding the acreage of these two crops in response to long-run increases
in the relative cost of surface water.  
This outcome has significant implications.  Since the effect of the rate change is to reduce
annual acreage but to increase perennial acreage, irrigators are adopting perennial crops as a
means of moving acreage out of less profitable annual crops.  Cultivation of perennial crops tends
to be very different from annual crops.  Perennial crops require a longer commitment of resources
to a crop.  Even if all of the physical attributes of an enterprise remain the same, the adoption of
perennial crops in lieu of annual crops represents movement into an alternative production
technology.  If the District’s rate change reduced the hurdle associated with moving from annual
to perennial crops, the District’s 1995 rate change may have inadvertently promoted investment in
perennial crops.  Water costs represent a much lower fraction of total costs for perennial crops
than for annual crops, so while movement into perennial crops may lead to increases in water
consumption it can also reduce the effects of rising water rates.  Irrigators appear to be adopting
perennial crops as a means of investing their way out of the effects of the rate change, a result
consistent with the hypothesis of technological change previously put forward.
Further support for this hypothesis can be found in Tables 4) and 5).  Table 4) follows
equation 11) and decomposes the marginal effects of a change in the surface water price r on20
applied water demand.  The short-run effects of the rate change are small and largely
countervailing as ground water is substituted for surface water, but the longer run effects
conveyed through acreage and technology changes are much more pronounced and generally
negative.  The sum of all effects is negative, which is consistent with profit maximization and
concave production technologies.  
When the marginal effects of a rate change on perennial acreage are isolated, however, the
picture becomes slightly different.  As shown in Table 5), the net acreage effects of a rate change
are to increase water demand from perennial acreage.  Since these crops account for almost half
of all of the cultivated acreage in the District, this positive effect may explain the acreage
adjustments observed by the District following the 1995 rate change.  Unfortunately, while it is
possible to isolate the acreage effects of the rate change, the two water demand equations cannot
be segregated by crop.  As a result, it is not possible to isolate how the rate-change influenced
water demand for perennial crops.  Given the importance of perennial crops in the District, their
acreage effects may be dominating any water use reductions implied by the two District-wide
water equations.  If that is the case, annual crops may be extremely sensitive to water rate
variations, while perennial crops are not.  This is an issue which should be explored further.
Traditionally water demand analysis does not differentiate between water sources.  This
study explicitly addresses the role water source substitutability plays in water demand and
determines how changes in surface water rates affect both acreage allocations and water demands. 
Results suggest that growers facing a rate change will respond through adjustments in both
marginal water applications and acreage adjustments.  Much of the acreage response appears to
be movement from annual crops to perennial crops, a result which is indicative of induced-21
technological change.  Unfortunately, while the 1995 rate change in the Arvin Edison Water
Storage District appears to have encouraged adoption of perennial crops, the empirical results do
not fully answer all questions stemming from that policy change.  In particular, econometric 
results suggest that marginal water usage should decline when in fact it rose.  While this may be
explained by the high percentage of the District’s acreage dedicated to perennial crops, available
data cannot adequately address this issue and further research is needed.    22
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Table 1: Coefficients for Water Demand 
Surface Water Ground Water
Constant 20.69  5.53 
t-value 0.71  0.06 
Alfalfa 4.89  3.66 
t-value 5.98****  1.40* 
Cotton 3.38  1.67 
t-value 41.71****  6.42**** 
Field 5.28  4.35 
t-value 1.95***  0.51 
Grains 4.76  3.33 
t-value 12.05****  2.63*** 
Pasture 5.32  4.45 
t-value 1.42*  0.37 
Potatoes 3.27  1.44 
t-value 14.3****  1.97** 
Truck 3.54  1.71 
t-value 19.54****  2.94**** 
Citrus 4.67  2.25 
t-value 10.16****  1.53* 
Deciduous 4  1.98 
t-value 1.81**  0.28 
Vineyards 2.62  1.14 
t-value 9.35****  1.27* 
r/v -26.52  17.97 
t-value -3.34****  0.71 
(r/v)*technology -21.82  2.15 
t-value -27.56****  0.85 
Rate Change 0.53  -17.68 
t-value 0.08  -0.85 
Drought -2.36  -8.79 
t-value -1.78**  -2.06*** 
NOTE: r is District surface water price; v is expected ground water cost given aquifer level and PG&E energy
rates.
Rate Change is dummy variable for 1995 rate change; Drought is dummy  variable for 1991 drought.  
LEGEND:  **** Significant at 0.01 level
*** Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.1 level
* Significant at 0.2 level25
Table 2: Coefficients for Annual Acreage Allocations
Alfalfa Cotton Field Grain Pasture Potatoes Truck
Constant 4.90  5.15  4.90  4.81  4.67  4.93  4.89 
t-value 2.01***  1.72**  2.21***  2.17***  1.68**  1.91**  2.29*** 
Alfalfa Price -9.42  9.19  8.64  8.61  7.99  8.78  8.68 
t-value -14.75****  11.75****  14.91****  14.86****  11.00****  13.00****  15.54**** 
Cotton Price 0.01  -0.23  0.15  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.07 
t-value 0.16  -2.97****  2.61****  0.00  0.00  1.05  1.27 
Field Price 8.91  10.41  -10.62  8.65  8.10  9.19  9.28 
t-value 2.10***  2.00***  -2.75****  2.24***  1.68**  2.05***  2.50*** 
Grain Price 9.80  10.03  9.69  -10.48  9.30  9.67  9.67 
t-value 2.00***  1.68**  2.18***  -2.36***  1.67**  1.87**  2.26*** 
Pasture Price 9.59  9.97  9.82  9.61  -10.46  9.68  9.79 
t-value 2.94****  2.50***  3.32****  3.25****  -2.82****  2.81****  3.44**** 
Potato Price 9.76  10.08  9.87  9.73  9.62  -10.16  9.86 
t-value 1.74**  1.47*  1.94**  1.91**  1.51*  -1.71**  2.01*** 
Truck Price 9.47  9.96  9.76  9.47  9.35  9.59  -10.28 
t-value 2.96****  2.54***  3.36****  3.26****  2.57***  2.84****  -3.68**** 
r/v -27.45  -22.76  -26.44  -28.38  -30.28  -26.47  -26.74 
t-value -5.58****  -3.78****  -5.92****  -6.35****  -5.41****  -5.09****  -6.21**** 
(r/v)*technology -0.27  0.00  -0.07  -0.22  -0.26  -0.17  -0.10 
t-value -0.57  0.00  -0.16  -0.51  -0.48  -0.34  -0.24 
Rate Change -0.46  -0.21  -0.11  -0.37  -0.37  -0.38  -0.17 
t-value -0.25  -0.09  -0.07  -0.22  -0.18  -0.20  -0.11 
Drought -0.18  0.21  -0.08  -0.15  -0.19  -0.06  -0.10 
t-value -0.17  0.16  -0.08  -0.15  -0.15  -0.05  -0.11 
Note: Prices refer to r/pk, so Alfalfa Price is r/palfalfa .
LEGEND:  **** Significant at 0.01 level
*** Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.1 level
* Significant at 0.2 level26
Table 3: Coefficients for Perennial Acreage Allocations  
Citrus Deciduous Vineyard
Constant 5.10  5.16  5.33 
t-value 10.06****  1.95**  2.14*** 
Own Price  -4.98  -4.99  -4.96 
t-value -1.59*  -0.46  -0.31 
Lagged Acreage 0.04  0.07  0.34 
t-value 0.46  0.31  4.39 
r/v -2.49  -2.48  -2.47 
t-value -3.02****  -2.61****  -0.84 
(r/v)*technology 0.64  0.56  1.06 
t-value 4.89****  6.71****  6.66**** 
Rate Change 0.03  0.01  0.03 
t-value 0.06  0.02  0.02 
Drought 0.04  0.03  0.06 
t-value 0.27  0.14  0.13 
Note: Own Price refers to r/pk, so Own Price for Citrus is Price is r/pcitrus .
LEGEND:  **** Significant at 0.01 level
*** Significant at 0.05 level
** Significant at 0.1 level
* Significant at 0.2 level27
Table 4: Sample Marginal Effects of a Surface Water Rate Change
Year 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Ms(@)
Mr
-0.29  -0.30  -0.30  -0.30  -0.30 
Mg(@)
Mr










































0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03 
MAW
Mr
-4.12  -4.58  -5.63  -6.19  -6.03 28
Table 5: Marginal Acreage Effects for Perennial Crops







































1.14  1.30  1.45  1.59  1.73 